于立宏,管锡展

• 1:复旦大学管理学院
• 2:复旦大学管理学院 上海 200433
• 3:上海 200433

摘要(Abstract)：

当双边委托-代理关系中的委托人从一个增加到数个时,委托人之间便产生了合作与竞争的问题,此环境下的激励机制设计与传统委托-代理关系相比就要复杂得多。自Bernheim和Whinston(1985,1986)提出多委托人(亦称共同代理)框架以来,Martimort(1996～2004)的一系列论文进一步发展了多委托人激励理论。本文系统梳理了该领域的主要研究路径:一是共同代理博弈均衡的特征;二是多委托人环境下的激励机制设计原理;三是委托人的竞争与合作对激励提供的影响;四是代理人面临多任务情况时的激励问题。最后论文总结了多委托人激励理论的多方面应用并探讨了其未来的发展方向。

关键词(KeyWords)： 多委托人激励理论;共同代理;激励机制设计

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 于立宏,管锡展

参考文献(References)：

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• ①当然,如果代理人具有不同的目标函数却没有私人信息,则委托人就可以通过提供一个完全合约来控制代理人的 行为,使其按照自己的要求行动,那么代理过程中的激励问题也就不复存在了。
• ②总的均衡激励方案指两个委托人提供给代理人的支付的总和。 (责任编辑:禾 日)