唐祥来

• 1:南京财经大学财政与税务学院

摘要(Abstract)：

政府产业总是扩张的。本文建立数理模型考察了公私伙伴关系治理模式对于政府产业规模扩张的约束机制及其效果。公私伙伴关系治理模式能提高公共支出效率,扩大公共服务供给,有效抑制政府产业规模扩张。在公私伙伴关系框架下,政府官员选择一个私人合约者建造和运行项目,理想的公共会计准则能有效约束官员选择项目时的意识形态、社会关系考虑的行为倾向。在预算约束下,项目预期的成本变更反映官员扭曲的激励。如果允许项目部分地实施私人融资,则固定成本合约能够保障公共部门债务明晰并控制其产业规模。

关键词(KeyWords)： 公私伙伴关系;政府产业;扩张;约束;公共会计准则

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 教育部人文社科资助项目(项目编号:09YJA630059);; 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目(项目编号:09SJB880029)资助

作者(Author): 唐祥来

DOI: 10.13269/j.cnki.ier.2010.04.002

参考文献(References)：

• [1]Allen M.,Richard S.,1981,“A Rational Theory of the Size of Government”,Journal of Political Economy,89:914—927.
• [2]Ernesto S.,Talvi E.,Grisanti A.,May 1998,Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance:the LatinAmericanExperience,NBER Working Paper.
• [3]陈共.财政学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2009.
• [4]Alberto A.,Romain W.,1998,“Openness,Country Size and Government”,Journal of Public Economics,69(3):305—321.
• [5]Cameron D.R.,1978,“The Expansion of the Public Economy:A Comparative Analysis”,American Political ScienceReview,72(December):1243—61.
• [6]Benabou,R.,June 1996,Meritocracy,Redistribution,and the Size of the Pie,Starr Center for Applied Economics,New York University Working Papers.
• [7]Torsten P.,Guido T.,1999,“The Size and Scope of Government:Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians”,Eu-ropean Economic Review,43(4—6):699—735.
• [8]Egge J.K.,Thingstad T.F.,Engel,Riebesell U.,2007,“Primary Production during Nutrient-Induced Blooms at Elevat-ed CO2 Concentrations”,Biogeosciences Discuss,4:4385—4410.
• [9]Guasch J.L.,Laffont J.J.,Straub S.,May 2004,Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America,ESE Dis-cussion Papers.
• [10]Laffont J.J.,Tirole J.,1988,“The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts”,Econometrica,56:1153—75.
• [11]Martimort D.,Pouyet J.,June 2006,Build It or Not:Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships,IDEI Toulouse and Ecole Polytechnique Working Paper.
• [12]Bennett J.,Iossa E.,July 2004,Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services,Brunel University and CMPO(University of Bristol)Working Paper.
• [13]Hart O.,2003,“Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership:Remarks and An Application to Public-Private Partner-ships”,The Economic Journal,113:69—76.
• [14]Mauro P.,1995,“Corruption and Growth”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,110:681—712.
• [15]Habib M.,Zurawicki L.,2002,“Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment”,Journal of International Business Studies,33(2):191—208.
• [16]Jonathan L.,Tadelis S.,March 2005,Contracting for Government Services:Theory and Evidence from U.S.Cities,U-niversity of California,Berkeley Working Paper.
• [17]Mintz J.,Smart M.,May 2005,Incentives for Public Investment under Fiscal Rules,University of Toronto Working Pa-per.
• [18]Hemming R.,Oct.2006,Public-Private Partnerships,Government Guarantees and Fiscal Risk,International MonetaryFund Working Paper.