债务融资、经营者自身利益与产品市场寡头竞争Capital Structure, Agency Problem and Competition in Oligopoly
邓春平
摘要(Abstract)：
Brander和Lewis发现,在寡头垄断的市场结构中,增加债务融资可以使该企业在产品市场竞争中变得更激进。本文通过引入经营者在产品市场竞争中自身利益这一新变量,发现股东有限责任效应导致的经营者扩大产量水平的动机与经营者权利责任关系不对称程度,与责任大于权利方向加深而导致降低产量的倾向之间存在一个权衡。随着单方面债务水平的提高,在某些条件下该企业变得更激进,而在另一些条件下该企业反而有可能变得为更消极。
关键词(KeyWords)： 债务融资;经营者;自身利益;寡头竞争
基金项目(Foundation):
作者(Author): 邓春平
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