胡凯

• 1:湖北经济学院财政与公共管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

通过将代理人的信息搜寻活动纳入最优规制模型,信息结构内生化下的激励性规制理论解释了代理人的信息优势来源及其信息搜集决策,并局部地修正了标准激励性规制理论的结论。以代理人信息搜寻的目的为主线,通过对近年来代理人战略性和生产性信息搜集方面的主要理论文献梳理,指出了该理论的主要贡献,最后对委托人的共同知识假设和需要进一步拓展的研究领域进行了评析和展望。

关键词(KeyWords)： 激励性规制;内生信息结构;信息搜寻;共同知识

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 胡凯

DOI: 10.13269/j.cnki.ier.2010.02.002

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