袁鲲

• 1:广东商学院金融学院

摘要(Abstract)：

本文引入控制权的分配,建立了一个不对称信息下创业者和风险投资家合资组成创业企业的融资决策模型。结论表明,控制权分配显著地影响了风险投资中创业者和风险投资家之间的博弈均衡,风险投资家寻求获得必要控制权的努力,使创业者以部分控制权的转移为代价获得了较为优越的融资条件;控制权的均衡分配取决于创业者与风险投资家之间信息不对称的程度,信息不对称的程度越大,分配给风险投资者的控制权越多。

关键词(KeyWords)： 风险投资;控制权分配;价值评估;信息对称;融资决策

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 教育部人文社科规划基金一般项目“资产价格波动与银行体系稳定:理论与实证研究”(项目编号:08JA790025);; 国家社会科学基金青年项目“资产价格波动与金融体系稳定研究”(项目编号:10CJL017)资助

作者(Author): 袁鲲

DOI: 10.13269/j.cnki.ier.2010.06.011

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