王宏,陈宏民

• 1:上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

标准拍卖理论不考虑竞标者合谋,而实际上合谋在标准拍卖中普遍存在并对拍卖结果(包括配置效率、竞标策略、最优保留价格、参与者收益等)有重要影响。最近相关的研究日益增多,目前研究主要关注了各种不同拍卖模式下合谋的难易及其对拍卖结果的影响,对合谋的侦测与控制,防合谋的最优机制设计。本文旨在反映关于拍卖中合谋研究的现状与最新进展,并展望了未来的研究方向。

关键词(KeyWords)： 拍卖;合谋;机制设计

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 王宏,陈宏民

DOI: 10.13269/j.cnki.ier.2010.03.010

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